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Abstract 
This policy chapter summarises an evolving debate on the effect of foreign aid on corruption 
and institutions.  It entails a series of publications that have been successively motivated by 
feedbacks from academic and policy making circles. The plethora of papers explores debates 
sustaining the direct, conditional and indirect effects of foreign aid on institutions. Moreover, 
another debate on the incidence of foreign aid distortions on corruption is also assessed in 
light of a recently celebrated literature on development assistance. Overall, the findings show 
that the effects of foreign aid on corruption and institutions are: directly positive; 
conditionally positive with a magnitude dependent on initial institutional capacity levels; 
contingent on fundamental characteristics of development due to heterogeneity and; indirectly 
positive or negative depending on the transmission mechanism. While the impact of foreign 
aid uncertainty on corruption is also positive, the sign on governance could change in light of 
governments’ commitment to increase its dependence on local tax revenues. 
JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55 
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1. Introduction 
 The subject of foreign aid remains widely debated in academic and policy making 
circles. In essence, there has been a recent stream of studies raising doubts about the 
mechanisms by which foreign aid is governed (Banuri, 2013; Krause, 2013; Wamboye et al., 
2013; Ghosh, 2013; Marglin, 2013; Titumir & Kamal, 2013; Monni & Spaventa, 2013). Some 
accounts in the narrative present a picture of foreign aid being governed by neo-colonialism 
(Amin, 2014). This stance is shared: on the one hand by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) on the 
entrapment of Africa within colonial power webs and; on the other hand by Kindiki (2011) on 
the need for the continent to strategically reduce its dependence on systems or regimes of 
international aid. This chorus has been joined by Obeng-Odoom (2013) who has articulated 
that foreign aid policies have to be holistic processes that clearly defined the needs of poor 
countries. This articulation converges with the stance of Amin (2014) who has equally 
emphasised that models of development should not be restricted to what donors wish was 
good for poor economies
1
.  
 The above new and evolving stream substantially supports recently celebrated 
literatures on foreign aid, notably: The Bottom Billion (Collier, 2007), Dead Aid (Moyo, 
2009) and the Somaliland Eubank (2012) hypothesis. These literatures have a common 
denominator of suggesting a rethinking of foreign aid policies and mechanisms.  
 While there is a general consensus on the need for good institutions in African 
development (Wantchekon, 2003; Vicente & Wantchekon, 2009; Boyce & Ndikumana, 1998, 
                                                          
1
 There is a growing literature on the dynamics of well being and happiness in the economics of foreign aid 
(Arvin & Lew, 2010ab, 2011, 2012ab).  
 
3 
 
2001, 2003, 2011; Fosu, 2013ab; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014), the use of development 
assistance as a policy instrument in promoting institutions in developing countries has been a 
subject of much controversy because prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, foreign aid was 
essentially used to prevent African governments from associating with the Soviet Union 
(Gibson et al., 2014). Accordingly, the aid-institutions debate has revolved around three main 
strands, inter alia: the effect of foreign aid on institutions; if more development assistance is 
allocated to countries with higher standards of institutions and; how aid can be used to 
transform institutions (Arvin et al., 2002; Arvin & Barillas, 2002). The policy-oriented 
chapter is more focused on how aid affects institutions with particular emphasis on 
corruption. 
 The debate on the effect of foreign aid on corruption first begins with Asongu (2012a) 
concluding that the Okada & Samreth (2012) findings on the negative nexus between aid and 
corruption may not be relevant for Africa. Second, following informal criticisms on 
differences in methodologies, Asongu (2013a) employs the quantile regression approach of 
the underpinning paper to confirm his earlier findings. A positioned that is confirmed in a 
dynamic cultural setting (Asongu, 2015a) as well as with institutional benchmarks of foreign 
aid effectiveness (Asongu, 2015b). Third, to further reconcile the debate, Asongu & Jellal 
(2013) have used fiscal behaviour (of taxation and government expenditure) and private 
investment channels to show that the sign of the effect depends on the mechanism by which 
aid affects corruption. In essence, aid channelled through government expenditure (private 
investment) increases (decreases) corruption. Fourth, Asongu (2014a) has provided more 
subtlety to the analysis by decomposing African countries into fundamental characteristics of 
its development. The findings reflect significant heterogeneity across the investigated 
homogenous panels. Fifth, the conjecture of Eubank (2012) has been validated by Asongu 
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(2014b) and used to elucidate the Kangoye (2013) findings by Asongu (2014c). He has 
concluded that while the Kangoye findings on a positive nexus between aid uncertainty and 
corruption are relevant, when the concept of governance is extended beyond corruption, the 
findings become irrelevant for the African continent.  
 The rest of the chapter is organised in the following manner. Section 2 discusses the 
effect of foreign aid on corruption. The effectiveness of foreign aid in institutional quality is 
engaged in Section 3. Section 4 covers the channels of foreign aid to corruption. The dynamic 
effects of foreign aid on corruption are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 is focused on the 
nexus between foreign aid uncertainty and corruption. We conclude with Section 7.  
2. The effect of foreign aid on corruption 
 The debate begins with Asongu (2012a) stressing on methodology and policy issues 
from the Okada & Samreth (2012) paper. The former presented the methodological 
underpinnings of their paper as the following: “previous research has primarily been based 
on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), instrumental variables and panel estimation. These 
approaches have disadvantages, as they only estimate the parameters of interest at the mean 
evaluation by a conditional distribution of the dependent variable (Billger & Goel, 2009)” 
(p.240). In order to confirm the empirical motivation, he has assessed Billger & Goel (2009) 
and found the following:  “many previous studies of the determinants of corruption employ 
OLS estimation, therefore reporting parameters estimates at the conditional mean of 
corruption. While mean effects are certainly important, we expand upon such findings using 
quantile regression. In addition, an underlying assumption for OLS regression is that the 
error term and the dependent variables are normally distributed…..OLS estimation can yield 
unreliable estimates, but quantile regression does not require a normally distributed error 
term” (pp. 300-301).  
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According to the narrative, three points are derived after the cross-examination. First,  
the panel instrumental variable techniques of estimation are not invalidated by Billger & Goel 
(2009). Second, when classical conditions for OLS validity are satisfied conditional on the 
exogenous variables (i.e. the presence of an independently and identically distributed error 
term), quantile regression become redundant, implying all conditional quantiles of the 
endogenous variable march lockstep in relation to the conditional mean. Third, whereas the 
criticism from Okada & Samreth holds ground in relation to OLS, it is lacking in substance if 
extended to some panel dynamic and instrumental variable estimation strategies.  
 The study has assessed a panel of 52 African nations with data from World Bank 
Development indicators for the period 1996-2010. In essence, Okada & Samreth have 
employed data from 120 developing countries for the period 1995-2009. The dependent 
variables are the corruption-perception and corruption-control indexes. The exogenous 
variable is Net Official Development Assistance (NODA) to which NODA from the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) nations and multilateral donors are included for 
robustness purposes.  
 Using panel system Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) and Two-Stage-Least 
Squares instrumental variable techniques, the findings run counter to those of Okada & 
Samreth. Compared to the quantile regression technique employed by Okada and Samreth, the 
GMM and 2SLS techniques control for endogeneity. It is concluded that development 
assistance mitigates (fuels) corruption-control (corruption). As a policy implication, Asongu 
(2012a) has concluded that the findings of Okada & Samreth for developing countries may 
not be relevant for Africa. This has led to informal criticisms in academic circles as some 
have argued that the Asongu (2012a) and Okada & Samreth findings are not directly 
comparable because they are based on two different methodologies. This has led to the second 
strand of the debate because; Asongu has not exclusively limited his response to corruption.  
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3. The impact of foreign aid on institutional quality 
 This second strand has been informally initiated by some scholars who have criticised 
Asongu (2012a) for failing to account for the conditional element in the Okada & Samreth 
finding (“…reduces corruption especially and its reduction effect is greater in less corrupt 
countries” p.1). As a direct response, the debate has been extended by Asongu (2013a) in a 
twofold manner. First, he has enlarged the scope of the inquiry from corruption to eight 
governance variables. These include measurements of: political governance (political stability 
and voice & accountability), economic governance (government effectiveness and regulation 
quality) and institutional governance (rule of law and corruption-control). Second, he has used 
the same empirical underpinnings (or quantile regression) as in Okada & Samreth. Central to 
this extension is the hypothesis that the institutional downside of development assistance as 
suggested by Okada & Samreth may be questionable in the presence of higher initial levels of 
institutional development at the domestic level. The quantile regression approach used by 
both authors does not account for endogeneity. The technique consists of investigating the 
effects of the independent variables throughout the conditional distributions of the dependent 
variable.  
With this hypothetical basis factored-in, Asongu (2013a) has confirmed the Asongu 
(2012a) finding on the negative character of foreign aid on the quality of institutions in 
Africa. The empirical evidence has been based on 53 African countries with data from 
African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank for the period 1996-2010.  The 
Asongu (2013a) finding has been further confirmed using varying specifications and 
positioning, inter alia: in the presence of dynamic cultural settings (Asongu, 2015a) as well as 
when assessing institutional benchmarks for foreign aid effectiveness (Asongu, 2015b). 
Asongu (2015ab) are also based on quantile regressions that do not account for endogeneity.  
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The conditional estimation debate has been extended by Asongu (2015a) in a twofold 
manner. First, he has disaggregated the dataset into fundamental characteristics of legal 
origins and religious domination, to assess how cultural dynamics affect the aid-corruption 
nexus. Second, contrary to past studies that have been based on a limited number of variables 
(Treisman, 2000), the author has considered recent corruption studies to incorporate 
additional control variables that could affect the signs of the estimations.  For instance, the 
economic, political, trade and press freedom channels employed have been recommended by    
Saha et al. (2009)
2
 and Peyton & Belasen (2012)
3
.  
The study has investigated a panel of 46 African countries using an updated dataset for 
the period 2002-2010 from ADI of the World Bank, Grwarney et al. (2011) and Freedom 
House. While the negative aid-‘corruption-control’ is broadly confirmed, the findings add 
subtlety to the debate by presenting some interesting heterogeneous results.  
From a legal origin perspective, four key findings are noticeable. First, whereas 
political freedom fuels corruption-control (CC) in the low quantiles of English common law 
nations, evidence of such is not present in French civil law countries. Second, CC is 
consistently improved by the quality of government across all quantiles in countries of 
English common law. This is not the case in middle quantiles of their French civil law 
counterparts. Third, economic freedom improves CC only in bottom quantiles of Common 
                                                          
2 “This paper examines the effects of economic freedom, democracy and its interaction term on controlling 
corruption. The results indicate that interaction between economic freedom and democracy has a significant 
impact on combating corruption. Partial effect analysis shows that economic freedom reduces corruption in any 
political environment, and the effect is substantially greater with a higher-level of democracy. In contrast 
democracy increases corruption when the level of economic liberalization is low, however, once past the 
threshold level corruption is substantially lower with full economic freedom” (Saha et al., 2009, p.1). 
3 “Corruption has affected systems of governance for thousands of years. Existing evidence suggests that it is 
especially common in "emerging and developing economies," yet cross-country analysis in this context is rare. 
We examine the impact of political, economic and media freedom on corruption in a large sample of countries 
across multiple time periods to investigate the marginal differences within each. The results show that increased 
economic and press freedoms are associated with lower levels of corruption in developing countries. We find 
that although increased political freedom through democratization is statistically significant, it reduces 
corruption only in developed countries and may increase levels of corruption in developing countries” (Peyton 
& Belasen, 2012, p. 1). 
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law countries. Fourth, no significantly positive ‘press freedom’-CC relation is found. 
Moreover, Low income French civil law (English common law) nations are predisposed to 
higher (lower) levels of CC. 
With respect to the religious dimension of the results, the following findings were 
established. First, trade and political freedoms mitigate CC in Christian-dominated nations 
whereas press freedom exerts a mitigation impact in both cultures of religion. However, the 
mitigating tendency is more consistent across the distribution of nations that are Christian-
oriented. Second, the quality of government is more positively correlated with CC in 
Christian-oriented countries than it is in Muslim-dominated nations. Third, whereas the 
relationship between economic freedom and CC is scantily negative in Christian-dominated 
nations, the impact is positive in their Muslim-oriented counterparts. Fourth, a low-income 
status in nations with traditions of Christianity and Common law improves CC.   
The debate has been further extended from the investigation of institutional 
benchmarks of foreign aid effectiveness using data from 22 African countries for the period 
2002-2009. Asongu (2015b) has factored-in two main streams in the aid-institutions 
relationship. Accordingly, he has assessed if thresholds or institutional benchmarks matter for 
the effectiveness of development assistance in institutional capacity building.  Seven 
institutional quality variables have been employed, notably: regulation quality, rule of law, 
political stability, corruption-control, government effectiveness, democracy and voice & 
accountability.  
Three hypotheses are tested and the findings that are consistent across conditional 
distributions of institutional quality and specifications have three main implications. First, the 
institutional rewards of development assistance are contingent on initial levels of institutions 
in Africa. Second, but for a slight exception, development assistance is instrumental in 
institutional capacity building in nations with low initial levels in institutional quality. Third, 
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the institutional rewards of foreign aid are questionable in nations with high initial levels of 
institutional capacity. As a main policy implication, Asongu (2015b) has recommended that 
blanket policies from aid-institutions assessments may not be appropriate. Hence, policy 
measures should be based on initial levels of institutional capacity and tailored varyingly 
across worst and best nations in institutional capacity.  
Jellal Mohamed has criticised Asongu informally for not factoring-in indirect channels 
into the debate. According to the former, mechanisms by which foreign aid affects corruption 
could substantially affect the nexus.  
 
4. Channels of foreign aid to corruption 
This dimension of the debate has been motivated by the lack of a unifying framework. 
According to Asongu & Jellal (2013), the Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu debate has 
been based on modelling the direct effects of foreign aid on corruption. The authors are in 
accordance with Knack & Keefer (1995)
4
 in arguing that when institutional quality is 
modelled as a direct consequence of development assistance, misleading policy implications 
could result because the model does not factor-in channels via which foreign aid affects 
institutional quality.  
The authors use fiscal behaviour and investment mechanisms to improve the debate on 
how foreign aid affects corruption. The theoretical underpinnings for their work are deeply 
rooted in the Harrod-Domar and Solow growth models. Accordingly, these models are based 
on the imperative of aid-financed augmentations in investment, in order to bridge apparent 
gaps in ‘poverty and development’ (Easterly, 2005). In this light, the authors postulate that 
taxation and government expenditure which represent fiscal behaviour are substantially 
affected by development assistance.  
                                                          
4
 Knack & Keefer (1995, p. 223) have arrived at the conclusion that more variables are needed in order to 
properly assess institutional quality.  
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Therefore, employing panel instrumental variable estimations, the Asongu & Jellal 
(2013) have extended the debate using a panel of 53 African countries for the period 1996-
2010. An endogeneity-robust instrumental variable estimation technique is employed in which 
foreign aid and grants are employed as instruments. Two principal results have been 
established. On the one hand, development assistance that uses government expenditure as a 
transmission mechanism has the tendency of increase corruption. On the other hand, foreign 
aid that is channelled through tax effort and private investment could potentially mitigate 
corruption. Hence, the authors recommend that development assistance which aims to fight 
corruption should use tax effort and private investment mechanisms, instead of government 
expenditure.  In summary, by integrating an indirect component, the authors reconcile the 
debate by establishing that the sign of the effect depends on the transmission mechanism. 
Hence, the effects are dynamic.  
5. On the dynamic effects of foreign aid to corruption 
 This strand of  the debate on the dynamic effects of foreign aid has arisen from a 
recent stream of studies that has consistently sustained that in the modelling of corruption, 
fundamental characteristics of development are key to controlling for potential heterogeneity 
among countries (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2011; Jellal & Bouzahzah, 2012; Hollyer & 
Wantchekon, 2012; Kodila-Tedika, 2012, 2013; Musila, 2013; Asongu, 2015a). Hence, 
Asongu (2014a) has put together more pieces of the puzzle by providing dynamic 
investigations that account for legal origins, the wealth of nations, regional proximity, 
religious domination, politico-economic stability, natural resources and openness to sea. 
According to the narrative, the weight of the fundamental characteristics of development is 
essential for targeted and less blanket policy implications. The empirical evidence is based on 
an endogeneity-robust dynamic panel system GMM estimation with data from 53 African 
nations for the period 1996-2010. The results show that the positive effect of development 
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assistance on corruption is most apparent in: French civil law, Middle-income, Christian-
dominated, non-oil exporting and landlocked nations. Moreover, there is also some scanty 
evidence of foreign aid increasing corruption-control in Lower Middle income and ‘not 
landlocked’ countries.  A discussion of some reasons behind these differences is worthwhile. 
 With regard to how colonial legacy plays out, French civil law nations are more 
predisposed to being corrupt than their counterparts of English common law. This finding is 
consistent with theoretical and empirical literature. Accordingly, the theory on law and 
property rights sustains that, for legal systems in which less emphasis is placed on private 
property rights vis-à-vis State power, corruption tends to be less (La Porta et al., 1998; La 
Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, it is very likely to find situations where a substantial part of 
development assistance is misappropriated because the institutional web of informal norms, 
formal rule and enforcement features are weak. As sustained by Asongu (2012c), the 
discussed advantage of English legal origins over their French civil law counterparts has been 
extended to other areas of management, inter alia: better institutions with governments that 
are less corrupt (La Porta et al., 1999); more efficient courts (Djankov et al., 2003) and; better 
informative standards of accounting (La Porta et al., 1998). This literature has been confirmed 
in Africa recently, among others: the weight of legal origins in the quality of government 
(Asongu, 2012b, 2014d) and institutions of property rights (Asongu, 2014e).  
 The higher positive aid-corruption relationship in nations that are dominated with 
Christianity, relative to those that are Islam-oriented could essentially be elucidated by the 
weight of development assistance in the fundamental features. Accordingly, based on the 
summary statistics, the latter are less reliant on foreign aid than the former: 9.79 versus 11.36 
as a percentage of GDP. Another possible explanation may be that, the punishment on culprits 
of corruption may be more severe in the latter than in the former set of nations. In a nutshell, 
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the findings reflect to a great extent why nations that are dominated by Christians may be 
more predisposed to devoting more efforts in fighting corruption (Asongu, 2012b, p. 191). 
 There is a simple answer to the concern of why countries that are non-oil exporting 
could be more corrupt contingent on development assistance. Accordingly, nations exporting 
petroleum received considerably less development assistance (3.29% of GDP) as compared to 
non-exporting oil nations (12.59% of GDP).  
 The point that development assistance could potentially induce more corruption in 
countries that are closed to the sea in relation to their counterparts which are more open was 
quite expected. There is a twofold motivation for this expectation. On the one hand, countries 
that are landlocked on average tend to get more aid: 12.55% compared to 10.06% of GDP. On 
the other hand, there is an institutional cost of being landlocked (Arvis et al., 2007).  
6. Foreign aid uncertainty and corruption  
The Eubank (2012) conjecture/hypothesis has been validated by Asongu (2014b). The 
conjecture has been further employed by Asongu (2014c) to elucidate the findings of 
Kangoye (2013). The author has concluded that while the Kangoye findings on a positive 
nexus between aid uncertainty and corruption are relevant, when the concept of governance is 
extended beyond corruption, the findings become irrelevant for the African continent. 
In essence, the Kangoye (2013) results on the negative effect of development 
assistance unpredictability and governance is as follows: “This paper examines the effects of 
aid on governance from a different perspective by asserting that aid unpredictability can 
potentially increase corruption in recipient countries by providing incentives to risk-averse 
and corrupt political leaders to engage in rent-seeking activities. Analyses of data from 80 
developing countries over the period 1984–2004 offer evidence that higher aid 
unpredictability is associated with more corruption as measured by a synthetic index. We also 
find further evidence that this latter impact is more severe in countries with weak initial 
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institutional conditions. These findings are a supplementary advocacy for the need for better 
management and better predictability of aid flow in developing countries”. (p. 121). 
The findings have been extended by Asongu (2014c) because of a recently celebrated 
conjecture from Eubank (2012). Accordingly, limiting the concept of governance to its 
institutional dimension could be quite misleading. In essence, whereas corruption has been 
used as the principal endogenous variable, governance is employed in the title. Asongu 
(2014c) has been consistent with Kaufmann et al. (2010) and recent literature (Andrés & 
Asongu, 2013; Andrés et al., 2014; Amavilah et al., 2014) in broadening the concept of 
governance, notably: political (voice & accountability & political stability/no violence), 
institutional (rule of law and corruption-control) and economic (regulation quality and 
governance effectiveness).  
Therefore based on the above, two principal axes that converge and clearly standout 
are: (1) Somaliland on which the hypothesis is founded is ineligible for official development 
assistance but enjoys relatively better standards of governance and; (2) the findings of 
Kangoye (2013) are parallel to the Eubank (2012) intuition. The empirical evidence has been 
founded on 53 African nations with data from ADI of the World Bank for the period 1996-
2010. Distortions are measured as standard deviations and standard errors. The estimation 
technique employed is an endogeneity robust system GMM.  
In the findings, Asongu (2014c) first confirm the Kangoye (2013) results when the 
concept of governance is limited to corruption. However, when a broader definition of 
governance is employed to entail, institutional, economic, political and general dimensions, 
the new findings run counter to those of Kangoye. Therefore, it is could be confirmed that in 
the presence of foreign aid uncertainty, governments are constrained to improve their 
standards in anticipation for more dependence on local tax income. There have been two 
principal policy implications from the findings. First, the results of Kangoye for developing 
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nations are seemingly relevant for Africa. Second, when the definition of governance is not 
limited to corruption, the Kangoye results are no longer relevant for the continent.  
7. Conclusion 
This policy chapter has summarised an evolving debate on the effect of foreign aid on 
corruption and institutions.  It entails a series of publications that have been successively 
motivated by feedbacks from academic and policy making circles. The plethora of papers 
explores debates sustaining the direct, conditional and indirect effects of foreign aid on 
institutions. Moreover, another debate on the incidence of foreign aid distortions on 
corruption is also assessed in light of a recently celebrated literature on development 
assistance. Overall, the findings show that the effects of foreign aid on corruption and 
institutions are: directly positive; conditionally positive with a magnitude dependent on initial 
institutional capacity levels; contingent on fundamental characteristics of development due to 
heterogeneity and; indirectly positive or negative depending on the transmission mechanism. 
While the impact of foreign aid uncertainty on corruption is also positive, the sign on 
governance could change in light of governments’ commitment to increase its dependence on 
local tax revenues. 
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